

Those Who Fight and Those Who Write: Overthrowing the Elite and their Institutions

Exploring Communist China & the United States

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This thesis is dedicated to my father, your idea all those years ago made for a quite a topic.

Abstract

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This thesis discusses the sociopolitical movement anti-intellectualism in both a historical and modern context. It is an interdisciplinary study incorporating history, philosophy, sociology, and political economy. The focus of this paper is anti-intellectualism as a whole, however in order to illustrate key pillars of anti-intellectualism, the history of anti-intellectualism in both China and the United States is used. This parallel demonstrates that even among seemingly opposite countries commonalities exist as a product of anti-intellectualism. This paper concludes with a discussion of the findings and their relevance to the proliferation of anti-intellectualism in society today.

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*“What else is there to do other than stirring things up? Stirring things up is
revolution.”*

Mao Zedong, July 1966

“Sometimes you gotta rage against the machine ... to hold them accountable [...] but you need to stay outside of the machines ... sometimes you gotta rage against it ... stay outside of the political establishments in order to hold them accountable”.

Sarah Palin, June 2012

Section I

Introduction

The war against the intellectual is not limited to a period of ten years in Chinese History, nor is it limited to four years of McCarthyism in the United States. Instead, the markings of anti-intellectualism can be spotted- by those with a keen eye- in years past and present. This paper constitutes a fundamentally interdisciplinary study of anti-intellectualism, drawing upon history, sociology, philosophy, and political science. This multi-faceted approach is both interesting and necessary; anti-intellectualism is a phenomena that cannot be explained one-dimensionally. Rather than examine anti-intellectualism in the same vein as scholars like Richard Hofstadter, Merle Curti, or C Vann Woodward, this paper attempts to take a different approach through the examination of China under Mao, and a broader survey of anti-intellectualism throughout American history. The reason for this relates to the realities of anti-intellectualism in each country; anti-intellectualism was a phenomena new to Communist China, whereas anti-intellectualism has had a presence throughout the history of the United States.

While this study will grapple with some of the larger questions concerning anti-intellectualism, it in no way is an exhaustive account of anti-intellectualism in either nation. In fact, it perhaps bears reiterating that while this work dedicates significant time to the examination of anti-intellectualism in Communist China and the United States, these examples serve a far greater purpose than simply providing context. Discussing these two seemingly opposite countries in tandem allows for an alternate perspective on the topic of anti-

intellectualism as a whole. In this way, this paper looks to add to the existing study of anti-intellectualism through an unexpected parallel.

Due to the breadth of this subject I have chosen to narrow and categorize my inquiry into three distinct themes that I formulated throughout my research. Each theme considers a separate-but interrelated- facet of anti-intellectualism. The first theme, “Suspicion of the Intellectual”, considers the historical trajectory and underpinnings of anti-intellectualism in each country. This theme is followed by “Society Divided”, which examines anti-intellectualism through the lens of classic social science theory. The final theme rounds out this study of anti-intellectualism through the analysis of charismatic demagogues.

As this paper will shift between countries, cultures, and time periods the precise meaning of each term is crucial to my argument. First, is the difficulty in defining an intellectual. In both pre-modern China and the United States an intellectual was not necessarily someone with extensive learning, but someone with enough education and social status that they were distinct from the uneducated masses.¹ In both countries the term intellectual was also not always commonly used, instead the term scholar was often used to demarcate this group.² In the sections of this work that discuss the intellectual in pre-twentieth century United States, or in pre-Communist China this more loose concept of the intellectual will be used.

The definition of the intellectual would change as education became more widespread in both countries, the shift would be marked by the increasing level of education needed in order to be considered an intellectual. This is because the level of education across society increased, thus intellectual became someone with advanced, formal learning. What connects the early definitions

¹ Ellen R. Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan'an Talks': Problems in Transforming a Literary Intelligentsia," *Modern*

² Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People," *The American Historical Review* 60, no. 2 (January 1955): [260], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41208586>.

to more current ones, is the idea that the intellectual is a brainworker “dedicated to the pursuit of truth” and the “advancement of learning in general”.³ Interestingly, the term intellectual would sometimes incur a negative meaning to those inclined towards anti-intellectualism. McCarthy famously referred to intellectuals as “eggheads”, and Eisenhower described the intellectual as a “wordy and pretentious man”.⁴ Within the sections of this paper that include China after 1949 and twentieth and twenty-first century United States this stricter definition will be used.

The definition of anti-intellectualism this paper will work from is that proposed by Richard Hofstadter, who characterizes anti-intellectualism as the general “resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind”.⁵ He also argues that anti-intellectualism is most commonly a feeling of ambivalence, not of malice.⁶ However, in periods where anti-intellectualism is heightened it takes on a more malicious form. Hofstadter posits the anti-intellectualism is a force that gathers power from multiple sources within society,⁷ the most important of which are discussed in this paper. On a final note, anti-intellectualism is often linked to anti-elitism. This is due to the long held overlap of the elite class and the educated class, as education throughout history has been a luxury not afforded to everyone. Anti-intellectualism, as a result, can act as a proxy for anti-elitism, but it is not necessarily identical to anti-rationalism.⁸ In this paper, however, the terms anti-intellectualism and anti-elitism will not be used interchangeably. While the topic of anti-intellectualism is inherently connected to anti-elitism the two terms do differ. I have elected to organize their relationship in this way: anti-elitism can take many forms, one of

³ Curti, “Intellectuals and Other,” 273].

⁴ Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York City, NY: Vintage Books, 1963), [5].

⁵ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [7].

⁶ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [7].

⁷ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [8].

⁸ Curti, “Intellectuals and Other,” [273].

which is anti-intellectualism, thus the study of anti-intellectualism in this paper is but one facet of the broader field of anti-elitism.

Section II

Theme 1: Suspicion of the Intellectual

In this theme an examination of each country's unique relationship with the intellectual will give much needed context on not only the role the intellectual plays in each society, but also explore the watersheds that contributed to increased anti-intellectualism. With each country it is important to note that the points of focus in this work are not an attempt to comprehensively detail each country's historical relationship to the intellectual. Instead, the chosen constellations identify crucial moments that defined the evolving role of the intellectual in their respective society.

In considering China, the selected periods or events include the Yan'an Period, the Anti-Rightist Movement, and will conclude with the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1971. These points were chosen as they represent the initial attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to formalize literary- and thus intellectual- policy as well as two escalating periods of unrest and persecution of the intellectual. Through analysis of the aforementioned periods a pattern emerges of rapidly intensifying anti-intellectualism over a comparatively short amount of time.

In the United States the pattern is markedly different; instead of closely cropped events this section includes a discussion of anti-intellectualism and Thomas Jefferson, the McCarthy era, and it will finish with an examination of the anti-science movement.

Unlike in China where widespread anti-intellectualism was a somewhat unprecedented phenomena, anti-intellectualism in America, according to Richard Hofstadter, is older than the

United States itself and a part of our national identity. Threads of anti-intellectualism in the United States are not always salient, as the prevalence of anti-intellectualism is subject to “cyclical fluctuations”⁹. As a result, the selected periods span the breadth of American history and reflect the peaks and valleys of anti-intellectualism in the United States.

⁹ Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York City, NY: Vintage Books, 1963), [Page 6].

The Yan'an Talks & Rectification Movement

Anti-intellectual sentiment reached peak potency during the Cultural Revolution, when its effects were most visible. Yet, this flourishing of anti-intellectualism can be thought of as a continuation and escalation of attitudes developed in the Yan'an period. Rather than discuss each ebb and flow of anti-intellectualism as it occurred, this section will focus on three periods that serve to illustrate the origins and development of the relationship between the CCP and the intellectual.

Early on the Central Committee recognized the value of the intellectuals to their cause, as it would be through these intellectuals that the Party's message could spread to the masses.¹⁰ The initial strategy in the northwest continued in the same vein as it had in the Jiangxi Soviet; the Red Army provided a range of entertainment, athletic, and education programs. This was a tested strategy for establishing support with local people, especially through the production of agitprop drama and music that could convey the Leftist's message in an uncomplicated manner. Intellectuals, and in particular literary intellectuals, were an essential component to this agenda and they were welcomed in large numbers to Yan'an. The Communist Party viewed the large numbers of young intellectuals flocking to Yan'an as "future cadres".¹¹ As for the writers and artists, they fled to Yan'an to escape persecution and oppression in the Japanese and Nationalist controlled regions. Many of them arrived eager to document what they viewed as an exciting new society and contribute to the revolution.¹²

¹⁰ Ellen R. Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan' an Talks': Problems in Transforming a Literary Intelligentsia," *Modern China* 11, no. 3 (July 1985): [378], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/188808>.

¹¹ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [389].

¹² Kyna Rubin, "Writers' Discontent and Party Response in Yan'an Before 'Wild Lily': The Manchurian Writers and Zhou Yang," *Modern Chinese Literature* 1, no. 1 (September 1984): [79]

Issues arose between the intellectuals and the peasants they were attempting to connect with. The city-bred intellectuals had very little in common with the rural peasantry of northwest China, and as a result struggled to adapt their work to suit local tastes. Similarly, when they attempted to take on elements of the local, rural culture their efforts faltered. Compounding this issue was a growing dissatisfaction among intellectuals who condemned the shift away from artistic quality in favor of a high volume of work that had mass appeal.¹³

This disconnect between the intellectuals and the peasantry demonstrated to the Party that a new type of intellectual was needed to cross such significant social divisions; this new intellectual class would need to be “open to revolutionary ideas but rooted in the culture of rural China”.¹⁴ The new class, however, would take a generation to realize. Until that point, the Party would institute policies that guided existing intellectuals in how best to co-opt Marxism-Leninism for rural Chinese tastes.¹⁵

Friction also bloomed between the intellectuals and the Party leadership and centered on their role in a communist society.¹⁶ A fundamental challenge to the relationship were the dual expectations of the Party; there was a call for intellectuals to be welcomed in large numbers and given opportunities for responsibility and further education, however there was also impetus to reform the intellectuals, making them more similar to the peasants and original party members.¹⁷

Their relationship was further complicated by the Party’s distinct need for intellectuals to establish and shape the emerging, revolutionary culture. The Party recognized that certain

¹³ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [388].

¹⁴ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [389].

¹⁵ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [390].

¹⁶ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [391].

¹⁷ Kyna Rubin, "Writers' Discontent and Party Response in Yan'an Before 'Wild Lily': The Manchurian Writers and Zhou Yang," *Modern Chinese Literature* 1, no. 1 (September 1984): [82]
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41490569>.

factions of the intellectual class would prove most useful for their agenda: writers, artists, and dramatists.¹⁸ Yet the very characteristics that made this group necessary to the Party's agenda also made them troublesome. For these ideological intellectuals a central feature of their role consisted of reflecting on their own social and political roles, a feature to the Communist Party when this led to criticism of the Japanese or Nationalists, but a problem when directed at the Communist Leadership.¹⁹

This era in Yan'an can be further differentiated into three periods: first, the late 1930's when intellectuals flocked to Yan'an to establish literary and artistic bases; second, the early 1940's, when intellectuals pushed to heighten the standards of work produced as well as train the new class of intellectuals; third, 1942-1944, when the Party's policy regarding the intellectuals was formalized.^{20 21} This period would become known as the Rectification Movement, which intended to create unity within the party on their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The prevailing interpretation would come to be known as Mao Zedong Thought. This period marked a dramatic shift for the intellectuals in Yan'an as well as heralded future policies governing intellectual freedom. Prior to this movement the intellectuals in Yan'an had near complete creative freedom,²² but the Rectification Movement placed new limitations upon the intellectuals and provided the foundation upon which later Party policies would be built.

¹⁸ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [379].

¹⁹ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [380].

²⁰ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [380].

²¹ Rubin, "Writers' Discontent," [Page 79].

²² Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [384].

The Hundred Flowers & The Anti-Rightist Campaigns

In 1957 Mao was the first and only Communist leader to ever invite open criticism²³ proclaiming, “Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools contend” at the Supreme State Conference that year.²⁴ These statements were related to the public at large by Lu Dingyi, the Director of the Propaganda Department. Lu explained that the policy was intended to promote the “luxuriant development of literature, art and science”.²⁵ The meaning of the slogan, he said, was to allow “freedom of independent thinking, freedom of debate, freedom of creative work, freedom to criticize, to express and maintain one’s own views”²⁶

Notable was an important caveat of the policy, “We, on the other hand, do not permit freedom to the counter-revolutionary elements; we must exercise dictatorship over them. [...] we must draw a clear political line between friend and foe.”²⁷ Even greater in limiting the new freedoms of thought were the limitations on what subjects there were allowed to be differences of opinion on. Subjects off limits included the love of the fatherland, and support for socialism.

Intellectuals in particular were asked to react to Lu Dingyi’s speech relaying the Hundred Flower Campaign to the people. Their initial reactions were cautious, with many asking practical questions in an attempt to probe the scope and limitations of the campaign.²⁸ Many were naturally concerned where the line of distinction was drawn between the permissible and the counter-revolutionary. There was an attempt by the Communist spokesmen to dispel the

²³ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign & The Chinese Intellectuals* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1960), [ix].

²⁴ Theodore H. E. Chen, *Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals* (Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), [117].

²⁵ Chen, *Thought Reform*, [117].

²⁶ Chen, *Thought Reform*, [118].

²⁷ Chen, *Thought Reform*, 119].

²⁸ Chen, *Thought Reform*, [121].

intelligentsia's fears, and thus foster greater responses.²⁹ Their efforts were not in vain, as there was a flourishing of intellectual activity in 1956; for the first time since 1949 many openly discussed independent ideas rather than simply reiterating the party line.

Fundamentally, despite this campaign, Mao's policy towards the intellectuals remained consistent with that formalized in the Yan'an period, "They must continue to remold themselves, gradually shed their bourgeois world outlook and acquire a proletarian, Communist world outlook so that they can fully meet the needs of the new society and closely unite with the workers and peasants."³⁰ The campaign was therefore a reflection of this policy in that it encouraged some "fragrant flowers" but discouraged "poisonous weeds".³¹

Intellectuals eventually, after repeated assurances from the Party that there would be no reprisals for criticism, did engage in free discussion. The sheer amount of criticism surprised the Party and left them uneasy, this uneasiness was demonstrated in Mao's address at to the Communist Youth League on May 25th, 1957.³²

The Party's response to this enormous outpouring of criticism was to create another mass campaign that encouraged the workers and peasants to attack counter-revolutionaries. They urged students and faculty within schools and universities to police the Rightists within their midst.³³ Another feature of this campaign was the push within the media to report on gatherings of workers and peasants protesting the anti-socialist agents, much if not all of them fabricated. The headlines served to give off the impression that the masses were engaged and organized in

²⁹ Chen, Thought Reform, [123].

³⁰ MacFarquhar, The Hundred, [111].

³¹ MacFarquhar, The Hundred, [111].

³² Chen, Thought Reform, [162].

³³ Chen, Thought Reform, [173].

their mission to defend socialism from counter-revolutionary insurgents.³⁴ The response of the intellectuals was not of immediate surrender; some famously held fast to their criticisms, yet one by one the intelligentsias were intimidated into silence.³⁵

Casualties of the Anti-Rightist campaign included professors, leaders of the democratic parties, and two newspapers.³⁶ Rectification campaigns were then launched in June to rid the state of Rightists; these campaigns used denunciations, self-incriminations, confessions, and loyalty oaths to humiliate dissenters.³⁷ Full confessions were made at the National People's Congress in June of 1957, the confessions often included a 'self-examination' that even referenced the confessors class origin and recounted their past 'crimes' against the socialist cause.³⁸ Confessions functioned to discredit the individual as they labeled themselves "bourgeois" agents, and "wicked".³⁹ The final push of the Anti-Rightist campaign broadened its scope to affect the entirety of Chinese society. Further denunciation campaigns were created that encouraged self-examinations and confessions of ordinary people. The Party claimed that the anti-rightist struggle was just beginning, and would continue tirelessly to expose rightists within the state.⁴⁰

What is crucial about this campaign, and what namely contrasts it with other Party led campaigns that targeted landlord's, counter-revolutionaries, and the bourgeoisie, was that this campaign was targeted squarely at the intellectual. Theories abound regarding Mao's true

³⁴ Chen, Thought Reform, [174].

³⁵ Chen, Thought Reform, [178].

³⁶ Chen, Thought Reform, [178].

³⁷ Chen, Thought Reform, [182].

³⁸ Chen, Thought Reform, [184].

³⁹ Chen, Thought Reform, [185].

⁴⁰ Chen, Thought Reform, [186].

motives for initiating the Hundred Flowers Campaign, with some asserting that it was nothing more than a clever political ploy to out dissidents. Others contend that the original intent of the campaign was as stated by Lu Dingyi, and that it was the severe, unanticipated criticism from the intellectuals that prompted the Party to initiate the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

Peking University's Big-Character Poster

Communism in China traces its beginnings back to Peking University, and so too can the Cultural Revolution. This is not to disregard the significance of *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office* and related consequences -which also played a role in the beginnings of the Cultural Revolution- but in so far as foreshadowing the anti-intellectual tone of the Cultural Revolution, Nie Yuanzi's Big-Character Poster and what followed is more deserving of analysis.

In May of 1966 Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and other devoted Leftists sought to further the implementation of the Great Cultural Revolution proposed by Mao. Through his wife, Cao Yi'ou Kangshan was able to bypass the Peking University Party Committee leaders, who had branded Nie Yuanzi as a Leftist, and speak with Nie Yuanzi and her followers directly.⁴¹ Cao Yi'ou encouraged them to rebel against the leadership at Peking University and assured them that they would be supported and protected from any repercussions for their actions. On May 25th Nie Yuanzi published her big-character poster in the main canteen of Peking University, in the poster she criticized Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun for obstructing the proliferation of the Cultural Revolution. The brazen denunciations of the Peking University leadership sent shockwaves through campus and led to the production of other big-character posters that disagreed with Nie's.⁴²

Concerned with the backlash at Peking University, Kang Sheng sent the original draft of Nie's big-character poster to Mao in Hangzhou. On May 31st Mao ordered that the text of the big-character poster be broadcast nationwide. On June 2nd a headline ran in the *People's Daily*

⁴¹ Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, trans. D. W. Y. Kwok (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), [40].

⁴² Yan and Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, [41].

claiming that Nie and six others had uncovered a “secret plot” underway at Peking University.⁴³ The aim of this plot, according to the article, was to work against the Party and against socialism. Readers were encouraged to hold fast to Maoist thought, to act as unwavering revolutionaries in their struggle to realize the Great Cultural Revolution.⁴⁴ The reaction was swift and powerful, within days the campus of Peking University was overrun with big-character posters, and supporters of Nie Yuanzi and her six comrades. Soon other universities and even middle schools in Beijing joined in the campaign began at Peking University.⁴⁵ Through the big-character poster, national attention was brought to Peking University, propelling it to the center of the burgeoning Cultural Revolution. The first casualties of public humiliations, denunciations, and violence against intellectuals would also occur at Peking University, setting off a wave of similar events across China.⁴⁶

This sequence of events is significant not only because they served as a trigger for the Cultural Revolution, but also because of the greater implications of them due to the prestige of Peking University throughout China. Peking University is one of China’s oldest universities, and undisputedly its most prominent. Peking University had maintained its reputation and status as an elite university, despite the dramatic shifts in China following the establishment of the Communist State. Prior to 1949 it had educated the most elite students in China, firmly connecting it to the wealthiest and most cosmopolitan Chinese families. After 1949, it continued to house China’s most influential scholars and educate the children of influential families. Thus,

⁴³ Yan and Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, [41].

⁴⁴ Andrew Walder, "Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution: History versus Myth," lecture, March 16, 2017, audio file, The London School of Economics and Political Science, March 16, 2017, accessed April 2017, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2017/03/20170316t1830vHKT/Mao-Zedong-and-the-Cultural-Revolution>.

⁴⁵ Yan and Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, [42].

⁴⁶ Walder, "Mao Zedong," audio file.

the significance of the first waves of the Cultural Revolution occurring at Peking University signaled a true attack on the upper class and the heritage of elitism inherent at Peking University. Further still, the rebellion against Peking University leadership functioned as a model for students at other universities and middle schools throughout China, because if students could wage revolution against an institution as distinguished as Peking University, it followed that students of any university or school could do the same.

The United States

The Suspicious Founding Father

It is a pillar of American tradition to glorify the actions of the Founding Fathers, men of pronounced classical learning, extensive expertise and knowledge. In its early years the distinction between the intellectual and the governing body in the fledgling republic was indecipherable. The presidency and extended government affairs were dominated by the Founding Fathers and educate gentlemen, and it was these learned men that strove to solve the most pressing issues of their time.

While the Founding Fathers were celebrated as a collective, certain figures- for reasons that will be made clear- were far less popular than others. Naturally, the figure in question was Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence, and the third president of the United States who supplied the democratic movement its intellectual foundation.⁴⁷ In discussing this earliest form of anti-intellectualism in the formal United States a natural argument can be made, and to that point has been made by many previously, that anti-intellectualism has been present throughout the course of American history. This is a crucial thread as it hints to the presence of anti-intellectualism as a hallmark of the American psyche then and perhaps now.

⁴⁷ Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People," *The American Historical Review* 60, no. 2 (January 1955): [266], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41208586>.

Many historians have noted the early attacks on Jefferson's character; Hofstadter in particular argues that the criticism itself reveals contemporary attitudes towards the intellectual, as well as instructs subsequent generations of anti-intellectuals.⁴⁸

Criticism of Jefferson bloomed in tandem with the "playing of politics"⁴⁹ among the members of that first congress that led to increased division and squabbling. Although not the only target, Jefferson received criticism from Federalists and clergymen concerning his role in the French Revolution and atheistic tendencies.⁵⁰ His detractors posited that as a philosopher turned statesmen Jefferson was prone to timidity, indecision, and inaction. As Hofstadter notes, what a politician needed was "not intellect but character, and here too Jefferson was found wanting".⁵¹ Instead, his critics argued, his qualifications suited him to a professorship and not elected office.⁵² Jefferson's character and qualifications were often contrasted- to his detriment- to those of the great General Washington. Rumors abound that Jefferson was a coward during the Revolutionary War, that he spoke ill of Washington, and desired to rule the United States as an emperor in the fashion of Napoleon.⁵³ The aims of these rumors were to interrelate such disagreeable and dangerous qualities with any mind of notable accomplishment.

While Jefferson would go on to become the third President, the suspicious and dangerous intellectual persona Jefferson's critics created have had a lasting influence. Similar denunciations would plague John Quincy Adams in the election of 1828 and give way to the United State's first

⁴⁸ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [146].

⁴⁹ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [146]

⁵⁰ Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People," *The American Historical Review* 60, no. 2 (January 1955): [266], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41208586>.

⁵¹ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [147]

⁵² Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [148]

⁵³ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [149]

populist president, Andrew Jackson. The campaign and presidency of Andrew Jackson, while also relevant in this theme, will instead be covered in greater detail in Theme III.

McCarthyism

Few figures in history have had an -ism added to their name, why even Hitler is exempt from this divisive group, and so it is safe to say that Joseph McCarthy has undeniable significance in terms modern American history.

Defining McCarthyism in a way that is broadly accepted is nearly impossible, so partisan and divisive was the man himself and the term he lends his name to. A contemporary New York Times article deemed McCarthyism to be “the invasion of personal rights, the irresponsible attacks on individuals and institutions, the disregard for fair democratic procedures, the reckless shattering of mutual trust among the citizens of this country, the terrorization of loyal civil servants- these are all elements of McCarthyism.”⁵⁴ Merle Curti, writing soon after the most vitriolic years of McCarthyism refers to it as “a particularly virulent form of anti-intellectualism in the popular sense” and as an issue warranting of international concern.⁵⁵

By contrast more conservative views hold McCarthyism in a different light, positing that it was a period of reflection and justified scrutiny initiated to eliminate legitimate security risks within the government.⁵⁶ Conservatives today are furthering this viewpoint, using the presence of legitimate communist agents like Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, to justify the extremes of McCarthyism and ultimately rehabilitate his legacy.⁵⁷ More interesting still to the subject matter of this paper may be the definition of McCarthyism proposed by Peter Viereck, who asserted that

⁵⁴ Editorial Board, "Editorial," The New York Times (New York, NY), November 11, 1954.

⁵⁵ Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People," The American Historical Review 60, no. 2 (January 1955): [275], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41208586>.

⁵⁶ Thomas C. Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations since Hofstadter," The Wisconsin Magazine of History 60, no. 1 (Fall 1976): [42], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4635090>.

⁵⁷ David Ward, "Joseph McCarthy Portrait," lecture, October 30, 2008, audio file, November 4, 2008, accessed April 2017, <https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/joseph-mccarthy-portrait-face-to-face-talk/id312570523?i=1000053589408&mt=2>.

it was a revolution of the uncultured masses and therefore grew not from staunch anti-communism, but instead from populism.⁵⁸

The McCarthy era began in 1950 with the now infamous Wheeling speech,⁵⁹ wherein Senator McCarthy claimed to have the names of upwards of 200 communists at work within the State Department. This number would also famously morph upon each retelling.⁶⁰ From there McCarthy used his growing influence to hunt for communists throughout the government, army, as well as the academic and scientific communities. Famously, professors and faculty in California had to take an anti-communist oath.⁶¹ Joseph L Rauh Jr. declared the end of the McCarthy era in 1954, justifying some of McCarthy's actions as a rational response to the threat of total war with the Soviet Union. In the same declaration, however, Joseph L Rauh Jr. noted that this legitimate fear was exploited by McCarthy and his supporters to gain political influence.⁶²

In the years following, the panic and hysteria incubated by McCarthyism faded, allowing for historians such as Richard Hofstadter to speculate the root causes for such a sudden spike of anti-intellectualism in modern America. In fact, it is in large part due to the McCarthy era that much of the Western-oriented literature on anti-intellectualism exists. For this reason alone, this period in American history warrants our consideration.

Seeking a deeper causation for McCarthyism is decidedly difficult, many scholars have attempted this task to varying degrees of success. Immediate reactions to McCarthyism, like those put forth by Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Bell, were hotly contested in a divided

⁵⁸ Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations," [46].

⁵⁹ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [Page 13]

⁶⁰ Ward, "Joseph McCarthy," audio file.

⁶¹ Curti, "Intellectuals and Other," [275].

⁶² Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations," [44].

academic community. It would not be until 1959 that a deeper analysis would emerge to satisfactorily explain McCarthyism. C. Vann Woodward posited that McCarthyism was not fundamentally rooted in class or status, but in the extreme economic pressures affecting many Americans.⁶³ Adding weight to this theory, the extensive studies done by Nelson W. Polsby showed that McCarthyism's base consisted of grassroots Republicans.⁶⁴ Polsby also asserted that McCarthy's success cannot solely be attributed to the grassroots base; rather, it was a combination of factors such as his position in the Senate that shielded him from libel suits, his savvy at self-promotion and media, as well as his willingness to distort the facts to suit his argument.⁶⁵ A final theory is a far more cutting one; Earl Latham theorizes that McCarthyism and the sensationalism of the Red Threat was a political ploy used by the Republicans to topple the Democratic stronghold in Washington. They allowed McCarthy to whip up fear, thus rallying the vote, and once Republicans enjoyed a majority they quietly let McCarthy orchestrate his own disgrace and quietly disappear.^{66 67}

In contrast to China and 18th Century United States anti-intellectualism, McCarthyism was not a movement prompted solely by class or status. Yet, Woodward's argument that it was instead influenced by economic pressure seems to overlook the connection of economic status to class.

Compared to other anti-intellectual movements, McCarthyism was comparatively short lived. There are several reasons for this; one theory holds that the swift and severe reactions of

⁶³ C. Vann Woodward, "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," *The American Scholar* 29, no. 1 (Winter 1959-1960): [56], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41208586>.

⁶⁴ Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations," [47].

⁶⁵ Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations," [48].

⁶⁶ Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations," [49].

⁶⁷ Ward, "Joseph McCarthy," audio file.

the intellectuals to McCarthyism was unified in its overwhelming criticism of the movement. This unity was crucial to inciting widespread condemnation of McCarthyism. Moreover, as the undisputed leader of the movement, the fate of McCarthyism was naturally tied to the career of Joe McCarthy. He was always a problematic leader due to his dishonesty and unpopularity within the Republican establishment. This rendered him vulnerable to criticism as well as made it easier for enemies to discredit anything he said or did. Finally, Latham's theory that McCarthy was only ever a tool in the Republican agenda suggests that McCarthyism was destined to be a prolonged period in the United States. Considering the forces that shaped McCarthyism indicates the potential underlying factors that influence the success- or failure- of anti-intellectual movements in a broader sense.

Anti-Science Attitudes the Politicization Thesis

Finally, our discussion of anti-intellectualism in the United States enters the present era and the realm of science. Anti-intellectualism today naturally applies to more areas of academia than just the sciences, but arguably the anti-science, and thus anti-intellectual, attitudes present in modern American Conservatism is a manifestation of anti-intellectualism unique to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

More so than ever before science and technology represent a fundamental opportunity for economic development and prosperity in not just the United States, but for every nation. Furthermore, science and technology now inhabit every facet of life, from the prescriptions we take, to the smartphones in every pocket, to the energy that fuels our cities, science and technology have a pronounced presence. Despite the prevalence of science and technology today, Americans in the 1950's had a more favorable view of science than Americans did in 2001.⁶⁸ While this statistic may be shocking to some, it comes as no surprise to scientists, who have consistently battled public apathy, ignorance, and worst yet hostility.⁶⁹

Common anti-science related issues include evolution, genetically modified organisms (GMO's), stem cells, vaccines, and climate change.⁷⁰ At this point, it is important to acknowledge that not all anti-science attitudes originate among the politically conservative, rather that some are also present among the politically liberal. Many theories abound concerning the chief sources of anti-science feeling within the United States, these include scientific

⁶⁸ In 2001 48% of the US Population agreed that we depend "too much on science" and "not enough on faith". Gordon William Gauchat, "A Test of Three Theories of Anti-Science Attitudes," *Sociological Focus* 41, no. 4 (November 2008): [338], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20832378>.

⁶⁹ Ellis Rubenstein, "Translating Good Science into Good Policy: The Us Factor," *Social Research* 73, no. 3 (Fall 2006): [1043-1045], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971870>.

⁷⁰ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [172].

illiteracy or ignorance, conservative religiosity, and finally one's social status and community.⁷¹

While each reason contributes to anti-science attitudes in the United States, both scientific illiteracy and the role of social status require more context in their relationship to anti-science sentiments.

Scientific illiteracy is the combination of a lack of appreciation of the nature, goals, and limitations of science, with a limited comprehension of important scientific theories.⁷² Scientific illiteracy is often the product of limited and or incorrect science education, which occurs, unsurprisingly, in higher rates among poor and rural people who lack access to quality science education.⁷³ While this theory is very logical, the data to support it is simply not there. What has been found is that in within more advanced societies there is a greater trust of science, but that within these societies further development of science education has had no statistical change in the public's trust of science. Instead, social factors such as gender, ethnicity, religiosity, and social capital are better predictors of a person's trust in science.⁷⁴

In addition to scientific illiteracy, social status is theorized to play a key part in an individual's relationship with science, as an individual's value of science correlates to their class' value of science.⁷⁵ This is because value is fundamentally a social construct, and thus the precise value of science is determined by the community. This is interrelated to scientific illiteracy, as the classes of people who lack a sound scientific education tend to populate the same communities. This compounds the issue of scientific illiteracy as not only is there limited or non-

⁷¹ Gauchat, "A Test," [340].

⁷² Gauchat, "A Test," [340].

⁷³ Gauchat, "A Test," [349].

⁷⁴ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [170].

⁷⁵ Gauchat, "A Test," [340].

existent access to correct science education, but there is also an apathy for or even suspicion of science within that community that renders the social value of science quite low.

Yet another theory, the politicization thesis, hypothesizes that as science has become politicized, trust in science among certain groups has declined. Traditionally science is an apolitical discipline, which derives its legitimacy within the political sphere through neutrality and objectivity.⁷⁶ This has allowed science in the past to overcome politically polarized issues and thus build a consensus among policymakers. In recent years, however, science has become increasingly politicized; an indication to some that the credibility science once enjoyed among policymakers has degraded. This raises concerns among scientists and the general public of what the politicization of science signals about divisions within the sociopolitical environment in the United States.

The politicization thesis holds that ideological conservatives have experienced a declining trust in science since the 1970's. The reason for this shift was the changing political culture of Republicanism at that time, due to the emergence of a new ultra-conservative faction within the party.⁷⁷ This new faction distills conventional Republican principles- such as a commitment to traditionalism- that are intrinsically incongruous with the pursuits of science to upend outdated practices, and continuously push established limits.⁷⁸

This ultra-conservative wing also incorporates the interests of the religious right and multinational corporations, both of whom are concerned with scientific outcomes. The religious right advocates for traditional values, and therefore views science as a modern, chaotic force

⁷⁶ Gordon Gauchat, "Politicization of Science in the Public Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010," *American Sociological Review* 77, no. 2 (April 2012): [169], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23102567>.

⁷⁷ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [171].

⁷⁸ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [170].

encroaching on their way of life.⁷⁹ Additionally, multinational corporations are subject to regulatory bodies like the EPA and OSHA, institutions which exist due to the growing body of regulatory science.⁸⁰ The relationship between multinational corporations and regulatory institutions are often adversarial, as these regulatory bodies can profoundly impact a corporation's bottom line. This is an interesting shift, because previously scientific advancement was positively correlated to the growing efficiency of production and thus, growing profits.

The politicization thesis was tested in a detailed study of political attitudes towards science from 1974-2012, conducted by Gordon Gauchat. The collected data proves that among self-identified conservatives trust in science has declined significantly since the 1970's. Providing statistical evidence in support of the politicization thesis. The trajectory of this decline, however, was gradual and did not hinge on specific events of the period.⁸¹ By comparison trust in science among self-identified liberals has remained largely unchanged since 1974.⁸² This has produced a growing disparity between liberals' and conservatives' trust in science. Perhaps the most interesting conclusion of the study correlates church attendance and trust in science. Gauchat found that among those who regularly attend church, whether conservative, moderate, or liberal, experienced group-specific declines in trust of science.⁸³ This further supports the politicization theory by showing that group-specific declines are not limited solely to political ideology.

Yet another interesting finding was that trust in science declined more sharply among college educated conservatives than among those with only a high school diploma. An

⁷⁹ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [171].

⁸⁰ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [170].

⁸¹ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [177].

⁸² Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [178].

⁸³ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [179].

explanation for this phenomenon could be that educated conservatives engage more with conservative ideology and have the intellectual tools to critically question science.⁸⁴ Furthermore, it could suggest that educated conservatives have been more susceptible to the identity campaigns of the ultra-conservative wing on the Republican Party.⁸⁵

Gauchat's study adds notable weight to the politicization thesis, and statistically proves that anti-science attitudes have grown specifically among political conservatives, and not among society as a whole. This is important as it emphasizes the connection between ultra-conservatism in the United States and the proliferation of anti-science, and thus anti-intellectual, beliefs. Considering the implications of this study in a broader sense, the decline in trust of scientific authority among conservatives could suggest that conservatives' trust in authority and institutions in general is also on the decline. This study also signals that science no longer has the authority to forge a political consensus, like it did in the 1960's. Moreover, the growing distrust in science among conservatives is likely to have a pronounced effect on the relationship between science, the government, and private economic interests in the future.⁸⁶ The result of which would only exacerbate the socio political divisions between liberals and conservatives in the United States.

⁸⁴ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [178].

⁸⁵ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [182].

⁸⁶ Gauchat, "Politicization of Science," [182].

Theme 2: Society Divided

Us & Them

The previous section of this paper explored the historical roots of anti-intellectualism, identifying watersheds in the trajectory of anti-intellectualism in both China and the United States. While that section did touch upon the historical underpinnings of each event, truly understanding the origins of anti-intellectualism requires that we dive deeper into social science theory. A recurring thread in the discussion of each point in the trajectory of anti-intellectualism in both countries was of antagonism, suspicion, and even violence occurring against the intellectuals. Moreover, the state of society, according to contemporary writers, in periods such as the Anti-Rightist Campaign or the McCarthy Era was both volatile and divided. A divided society, therefore, appears to be a common feature of anti-intellectual movements. Identifying a connection between anti-intellectualism and divided societies is easy enough, but it fails to draw any deeper insights. Doing so requires a foundation firmly established in social science theory.

Now, the theorists referenced in this theme were chosen due to the significance of their work, as well as its ability to challenge and develop our understanding of anti-intellectualism. Their disciplines skew towards sociology, however they incorporate elements of philosophy and economics as well. I chose to include Emile Durkheim, for his theories connecting the organization of society and types of law; Georg Simmel's work on modern societies also develops our understanding of the origins of social divisions. To approach social divisions from yet another perspective we will also consider class theory according to Max Weber.

Durkheim is perhaps most useful to our study when we consider the organization of Communist Chinese society. He asserted that pre-modern societies were united by mechanical

solidarity and a “collective conscience”. Durkheim defines the collective conscience to be the “totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society”.⁸⁷ These pre-modern societies tended to be small in size, and primitive in nature. Each member is largely self-sufficient, and yet the community is united by a shared set of beliefs, values, and fears.

Relating Durkheim to Communist China is interesting as it carries the markings of a pre-modern society, but also defies it in certain aspects. Communist Chinese society did share significant beliefs and fears, in part because of China’s Confucian heritage. In August 1966 Mao called for the sweeping away of the Four Olds as a central goal of the Cultural Revolution.⁸⁸ Included within the Four Olds were Confucian values that continued to shape Chinese society even two decades after the establishment of the Communist state, a testament to their resilience. Uprooting Confucian values served two purposes for the Party: first, it removed the dominant social framework; second, it opened the way for Maoist thought to become the central social authority in China. Mao’s efforts to do this varied, but among certain groups, like the Red Guard Maoist thought did become the prevailing ideology.

Durkheim posits that a society dominated by a collective conscience will enact penal laws, wherein “it is the assembly of the people which renders justice”⁸⁹ either themselves or through a delegation that can act as the interpreter of “collective sentiments”⁹⁰ This is because society’s collective belief system is so all-encompassing that there ceases to be one individual conscience and instead there is a communal conscience that links individuals like “elements of

⁸⁷ Emile Durkheim, "Types of Law in Relation to Types of Social Solidarity," in *The Division of Labor in Society* (n.p.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), [20-23].

⁸⁸ Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, trans. D. W. Y. Kwok (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), [79].

⁸⁹ Durkheim, "Types of Law in Relation," [19].

⁹⁰ Durkheim, "Types of Law in Relation," [20].

an inanimate body”.⁹¹ Durkheim’s theory seemingly provides a potential explanation for the most shocking outcomes of anti-intellectualism in China, such as the public denunciations, humiliations and violent attacks carried out by Mao’s followers during the Cultural Revolution. There is a caveat to this, however, as there was not a total unity of belief among the revolutionary groups acting during the Cultural Revolution. Quite the opposite, within the Red Guards, for example, there were several factions fighting for dominance at any one time.⁹² So, while within factions there may have existed a shared system of values, across the whole entity this was simply not the case. Another limitation of Durkheim is that his theories are not as easily transferred to our study of anti-intellectualism in the United States; moreover his work has been criticized on grounds of being over-simplified by scholars. While there are genuine criticisms to be made of Durkheim’s work, the unexpected relevance to the Cultural Revolution is fascinating as it suggests that the presence of a communal conscience may have shaped the most shocking outcomes of the Cultural Revolution.

Simmel, like Durkheim, discusses the origins of society comprised of “small circles”⁹³ wherein members share core beliefs and values. Furthermore, he stresses that the “self-preservation” of these groups depends upon “strict boundaries” and “centripetal unity.”⁹⁴ Once a group grows “numerically, spatially, in significance and in content of life” the unity that previously bound them weakens, as a result the lines of separation between them and others start

⁹¹ Durkheim, "Types of Law in Relation," [28].

⁹² Walder, "Mao Zedong," audio file.

⁹³ Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *Classic Essay on the Culture of Cities*, ed. Richard Sennett (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), [54].

⁹⁴ Simmel, "The Metropolis," [54].

to blur.⁹⁵ Once this process has begun members within the group are allowed greater freedom in their ideas and movement within society.⁹⁶

Simmel's theories on group unity are certainly relevant to anti-intellectualism; from this it is clear that within smaller groups it is easier to maintain a shared ideology, this too could explain the factionalism within the Red Guards. Moreover, the necessity of clear group divisions feeds into the premise that societal divisions contribute to development of anti-intellectual movements. If we consider this in light of anti-intellectualism in the United States, McCarthyism comes further into focus; McCarthy looked to create such a group dynamic by labeling communists as the enemy of the American people, drawing a line between communists and the rest of society.⁹⁷ Similarly, Mao also looked to strengthen group lines by differentiating critics by naming them Rightists or counter-revolutionaries.⁹⁸ Thus, through the lens of Simmel and Durkheim the form of anti-intellectual movements begins to take shape, they are well served by Durkheim's theory of the communal conscience, as well as preserved by Simmel's concept of centripetal unity and rigid boundaries.

⁹⁵ Simmel, "The Metropolis," [54].

⁹⁶ Simmel, "The Metropolis," [54].

⁹⁷ Edwin Berry Burgum, "McCarthyism and the Academic Mind," *Chicago Review* 8, no. 3 (1954): [57], doi:10.2307/25293063.

⁹⁸ Chen, *Thought Reform*, [181-185].

The Division of Labor

A key feature of pre-modern society, according to Durkheim, was the self-sufficiency of individuals, but as society evolved over time, and the dynamic density of society increased the glue that bound communities evolved. This change is direct result of the division and specialization of modern labor; no longer were people self-sufficient, but instead dependent on one another to produce necessary goods and services. Whereas Communist China had many of the marks of pre-modern society, Durkheim's concept of modern society fits more closely with the United States in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In fact, Merle Curti points to the increasing division of labor within the United States as a cause for anti-intellectual sentiment in the McCarthy era. He argues that with the "specialization of functions" the distance between intellectuals and the rest of society widened to such a degree that it was impossible for there to be viable connections between them. The result, Curti asserts, is the depersonalized relationship society has with intellectual, characterized by a lack of understanding and familiarity with one another.⁹⁹

Curti was writing in the wake of McCarthyism in the 1950's, yet his argument has sustained relevance. It is undeniable that the specialization of labor has only continued in the United States, with advancements in science and technology playing a significant role in its advancement. This could perhaps shed light on the growing anti-science attitude within the United States, suggesting that the highly technical nature of science in the twenty-first century has further alienated those who understand and benefit from science and technology from those that do not. As an appreciation of science is positively correlated with education- and in

⁹⁹ Curti, "Intellectuals and Other," [276].

particular advanced education-¹⁰⁰ anti-science attitudes are inherently linked with anti-intellectualism.

¹⁰⁰ Gauchat, "A Test," [340].

Class Divisions & Anti-intellectualism

Yet another source of division in society, and perhaps the most obvious, is that modern society is not one uniform organism, even within smaller iterations there are yet more small groupings that in turn make up the fabric of a society. We have discussed social divisions as a function of social organization and the specialization of labor, however our analysis of societal division is incomplete unless it also includes the role of class in anti-intellectual movements.

In the interest of avoiding confusion it should be acknowledged that while class has, and continues to be, defined in myriad ways the definition that this paper will work from is provided by Max Weber, “‘classes’ are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action.”¹⁰¹ More specifically, Weber posits that classes are determined “exclusively by economic interest in the possession of goods and opportunities for income”¹⁰²

Highlighted in this definition is how class distinctions may form the nexus from which organized, communal action flows. Now perhaps it is pertinent to also define what is meant by communal action, and how it might differ from societal action. Once again, Weber’s definition plays nicely into the context of anti-intellectualism, to Weber communal action is the “action which is oriented to the feeling of the actors that they belong together”¹⁰³ Conversely, societal action is “oriented to a rationally motivated adjustment of interests.”¹⁰⁴ Weber then gives scope

¹⁰¹ Max Weber, "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority," trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, in *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), [181].

¹⁰² Weber, "The Sociology," [181].

¹⁰³ Weber, "The Sociology," [183].

¹⁰⁴ Weber, "The Sociology," [183].

to these phenomena in noting that they often materialize in reality as “similar reactions” rather than “mass actions”.¹⁰⁵

In the scope of anti-intellectualism these theories point to both an origin and terminus. Weber’s class theory suggests that anti-intellectual sentiment could be a shared belief among a class of people that is used to achieve a common economic interest. Crucial to this principle is the aforementioned definition of class and class interest; in order to satisfy Weber’s interpretation the group of people must be demarcated by economic status, and motivated by economic self-interest. Anti-intellectual sentiment could potentially allow for those in a lower socioeconomic bracket to lash out at those above them. In doing so the actors can level the field, or at the least attempt retribution for the inequities in society.

Considering how Weber’s theories relate to China requires an awareness of the class system in China before and after advent of communism.

Prior to the Communist takeover in 1949, China was deeply divided along distinct class lines. A person fell into one of six classes: peasant, worker, merchant, landowner, academics, or nobility.¹⁰⁶ The class system was highly static, determining a person’s status, education, occupation, and even spouse.

Among the upper echelons was also China’s intellectual class, whose importance and dominance outlived dynasties. Unlike in other class-dominated societies China’s political environment led to the creation of a unique class, the scholar-official class.¹⁰⁷ In order to become a civil servant, scholars had to sit a highly competitive exam. The civil servant exam, in theory,

¹⁰⁵ Weber, "The Sociology," [183].

¹⁰⁶ Lynn T. White, III, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, n.d.), [50-51].

¹⁰⁷ Sreemati Chakrabarti, *Mao, China's Intellectuals and the Cultural Revolution* (New Dehli: Sanchar Publishing House, 1998), [16-23].

allowed anyone who could devote their life to studying the classics to become a highly respected and well-paid civil servant. In practice, however, such a level of dedication to studying was only possible for those who were already wealthy. This meant that scholar officials were primarily from the upper classes of Chinese society.¹⁰⁸

The civil service exam institutionalized the existing status of intellectuals. These civil servants in turn raised the following generation of intellectuals, further removing the intellectual class from the rest of the population. The state's civic examination was an essential player in formation of the scholar-official class, who then in turn represented the central government in provinces all over China. Thus, in pre-modern China the intellectual class was both distinct from, and one in the same as the government.

The status of the intellectual in China shifted dramatically in the twentieth century, beginning with the abolishment of the civil service exam in 1905¹⁰⁹ and the establishment of the Communist state in 1949. What had once been a formal relationship between the intellectuals and the government was now an undefined and uncertain one. While many intellectuals were involved in the origins of the Chinese Communist Party, their role diminished as the Party's leadership became dominated by Mao. This is crucial, as the historical role of the intellectual as an evaluator of government and society persisted, even though their official status had changed. Their critiques of the Party created tension between the intellectuals and Party leadership as seen in the Yen'an Period, the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Campaigns.¹¹⁰ More broadly speaking, the establishment of a Communist state in China had profound effects on the class system as a whole, not just on the intellectual class. In fact, much to the chagrin of true

¹⁰⁸ Chakrabarti, Mao, China's, [20].

¹⁰⁹ Chakrabarti, Mao, China's, [9].

¹¹⁰ Chen, Thought Reform, [Page 119-123].

revolutionaries, the communist revolution did not abolish social labels as it claimed to, but merely altered them. There still existed both good and bad labels for groups, such as ‘proletarians’, ‘cadres’, ‘rightists’, and ‘capitalists’¹¹¹. Just as in pre-communist China these labels demarcated status, which in turn determined work placement, housing, services, city or village of residence, and the schools children could attend. Even in Communist China, therefore, class division- and inequalities stemming from class status- were still present throughout society. As a result, anti-intellectualism in Communist China could be in accordance with Weber’s assertion that class action is motivated and incentivized by economic interests.

The class and status theory of anti-intellectualism is contested, however, as noted in Theme I; C. Vann Woodward argued against Hofstadter and others who supported the class-based explanation of anti-intellectualism. He disagreed that anti-intellectualism was fundamentally a symptom of growing class inequality.¹¹² Instead, Woodward claimed that anti-intellectualism in the McCarthy era was a result of escalating economic anxieties among grassroot Republicans. While Woodward was discussing anti-intellectualism in the McCarthy Era, his theory also relates to our discussion of anti-intellectualism in the broader sense. That being said, Woodward’s argument does not properly address the interrelated nature of class and economic status, as often those most vulnerable to economic pressures also tend to be those of lower class. This, naturally, is a simplification of the relationship between economic status and class, there are outliers to this. On the whole, however, and despite Woodward’s assertion, the overarching argument concerning class divisions and the emergence of anti-intellectualism in society stands. It is no coincidence that the periods of anti-intellectualism in Communist China,

¹¹¹ Chakrabarti, Mao, China's, [42-46].

¹¹² Woodward, "The Populist," [56].

and throughout the history of the United States coincide with moments of social flux and economic volatility. It is precisely these conditions that render the framework of society fractured and divided, leaving society open and vulnerable to socio political extremes like anti-intellectualism.

Theme 3: Charismatic Demagogues

Our final theme shifts the focus of our inquiry, from the sources of anti-intellectualism to evaluating its leaders. The foundation of anti-intellectualism is the combinations of forces discussed in Theme I and Theme II, but I theorize that these are simply prerequisites of anti-intellectualism, and that for the movement to truly develop there is one final necessary component: the charismatic demagogue. In both China and the United States we can identify the charismatic demagogue at the center of a the anti-intellectual movement, we can even take this a step further and relate the success or longevity of an anti-intellectual movement with that of its leader.

This theme will begin with a discussion of Weber, and his concept of the charismatic demagogue. From there the analysis will shift to the analysis of specific figures, Mao, Andrew Jackson, and Joe McCarthy. These leaders were chosen as they each represent a different iteration of the charismatic demagogue, while also embodying the core criteria title.

Weber's study of authority begins with his assertion that there are two forms that have had the greatest permanence, patriarchal and bureaucratic. The former is rooted in economy, and in the day to day functions that support it.¹¹³ Its modern adaptation is the bureaucracy, which is a systematic and planned structure designed to meet the recurring needs of society.¹¹⁴ Over time there has been a shift from patriarchy to bureaucracy. Reasons for this shift are clear: scale and efficacy. The bureaucracy's strengths are plentiful, but its weaknesses are highlighted in times of instability. In said circumstances "the natural leaders" are those with a capacity for "specific gifts

¹¹³ Weber, "The Sociology," [245].

¹¹⁴ Weber, "The Sociology," [245].

of the body and spirit”¹¹⁵. Thus, a parallel can be drawn between states in crisis and the emergence of charismatic leaders. This is a natural connection, as bureaucracy rarely pacifies a distraught citizenry. Moreover, the patriarchy is not so far removed from today’s society that it no longer appeals to some degree. Rather, in times of distress we may fall back on our faith in a patriarchy, and therefore a system with one core leader, emerges. A charismatic leader is therefore able to harness their own spectacular gifts to seize power and demand obedience from their followers.¹¹⁶

Crucial to this form of authority, is the understanding that in its purest form it is “the very opposite of institutionally permanent.”¹¹⁷ That is to say, charismatic authority is not inherently lasting. It can extend its lifespan in two circumstances: either the leader is able to perpetually create a state of instability- perhaps through war- that necessitates their leadership; or the charismatic leader transitions the foundation of their power from their personal self into a more structured bureaucracy. It can be deduced, therefore, that authority cannot be sustained on charisma alone, and requires constant cultivation. Similarly, Weber asserts that charismatic authority is, by its very nature, unstable. This is because the origin of power is bound to the leader’s persona, meaning that their authority must be constantly validated in order to maintain legitimacy.¹¹⁸

Certain features can characterize a charismatic leader; the leader must come to power in tumultuous, uncertain circumstances. Moreover, their authority must be derived from

¹¹⁵ Weber, "The Sociology," [245].

¹¹⁶ Weber, "The Sociology," [246].

¹¹⁷ Weber, "The Sociology," [248].

¹¹⁸ Weber, "The Sociology," [248].

personal “exemplary qualities” and the trust their followers place in their charisma.¹¹⁹ Some scholars argue that Weber’s definition of the charismatic leader is limited in its relevancy to the pre-modern West, and that it therefore cannot sufficiently describe non-Western leaders nor modern leaders like Joseph McCarthy.¹²⁰ This is because, they argue, Weber’s theory is entrenched in the religious realm, a realm that no longer applies in our “technological mass democracy”.¹²¹

I am inclined to agree with some of these critics that Weber’s theory is unable to specifically account for some of the features of the modern charismatic leader, but I maintain that Weber can still provide a useful foundation for analysis. In China, for example, there is not a history of religion in the same form as in Europe or the United States, however there is a potential Chinese equivalent, Confucianism. So, while this is not an exact equivalency it can still prove the broader point that Weber’s concept of the charismatic leader can be successfully applied to the study of Eastern leaders, and by extension modern leaders when it is appropriately qualified.

¹¹⁹ Weber, "The Sociology," [216]

¹²⁰ Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (Summer 1968): [732], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20023840>.

¹²¹ Tucker, "The Theory," [732].

Mao Zedong

When considering Weber's conception of a charismatic leader Mao is truly a natural example. Throughout his journey to the Chairmanship of the Communist Party Mao cultivated a public image as the supreme champion of the people; Mao continuously worked to shape his public image, rewriting elements when needed. Weber's theories of the charismatic leader add to our understanding of Mao's popularity among his followers during his life, as well as his enduring legacy.

To this day it is a difficult task to separate fact from fiction when dealing with Mao's personal history. Only after his death has the outside world been able to learn more about Mao, because during his life Mao's personal history was nearly impossible to discern.¹²² This was because Mao cultivated his mysterious air throughout his life, playing aloof to impress those he met with.¹²³

Mao's childhood is particularly enshrined in myth, some of which came about through the development of Mao's cult of personality. What we do know is that he was born in 1893 in rural Hunan Province to a peasant family. His father was a landowner, so the best classification of the Mao family would be rich peasants. Mao had a complicated relationship with his father and rejected his "paternal authority".¹²⁴

Mao's education was far more extensive than his parents, who were both illiterate. Mao attended local primary school until the age of 13 and in 1909 left his family's farm to attend school in a nearby village. Afterwards he attended middle school in Changsha and later entered

¹²² Richard L. Walker, "Mao as Superman," *Journal of International Affairs* 26, no. 2 (1972): [160], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24356507>.

¹²³ Walker, "Mao as Superman," [160].

¹²⁴ Howard L. Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung: The Lacquered Image," *The China Quarterly* 16 (Fall 1963): [3], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651570>.

the prestigious Hunan Provincial First Normal School in 1913.¹²⁵ He graduated in June 1918 and travelled to Beijing the following September. It was while auditing classes at Peking University in the fall of 1918 that Mao met Li Dazhao, the librarian of Peking University. It was Li Dazhao who arranged for Mao to work as a library clerk. After Mao left Hunan for Beijing his formal education ended, although his participation in academia, particularly writing, would continue throughout his life. Mao's own educational experiences are crucial to his developing relationship with the intellectuals and intellectualism. Even though Mao came from a poor, rural family he was far more educated than the average Chinese citizen at the time. His relatively high level of education coupled with his peasant upbringing served to create a two interconnected impressions of Mao; one impression was of his likeness to the average Chinese, and the other was of his superiority and remoteness. Stuart Schram argues that the dualism of Mao's character provided a crucial starting point in the development of his charismatic authority.¹²⁶

After leaving Beijing Mao returned to Hunan. From Hunan he took part in the May 4th movement, organizing and mobilizing students within the region. His involvement in these protests gained him "action, influence, and increased prestige" as a revolutionary.¹²⁷ He founded and edited a student newsletter in Hunan modeled after that published by Li Dazhao at Peking University. It was well received by young intellectuals.¹²⁸ Afterwards, Mao returned to Beijing and rejoined his old mentor, Li Dazhao. Li Dazhao's political convictions had become increasingly left-leaning, he first introduced Mao to the Communist Manifesto.

¹²⁵ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [4-5].

¹²⁶ Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-Tung as a Charismatic Leader," *Asian Survey* 7, no. 6 (June 1967): [384], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642613>.

¹²⁷ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [8].

¹²⁸ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [8].

As a result, Mao became invested in the developing political fray of the Socialist Youth League, the predecessor to the Chinese Communist Party.¹²⁹ In its early days the Chinese Communist Party was consumed with ill-fitting Comintern policies and factionalism. Comintern educated figures argued for the implementation of Communism in China following the Soviet Model, Mao, however, believed that Communism in China must center on the rural peasants. Unlike Russia, China in the 1920's was still politically fragmented and technologically primitive country with the majority population of rural peasants.¹³⁰ Mao's beliefs had him temporarily ostracized him from Party leadership until the 1930's.¹³¹

Mao became the undisputed leader of the Communist Party following the Long March and a time of particular hardship and turmoil for the Party. This is in accordance with Weber's theory of the charismatic leader who comes to power in times of instability. Moreover, through the physical hardships of the Long March Mao was able to demonstrate the strength of his body and spirit, yet another feature of charismatic authority.¹³² Mao's strong leadership throughout the Long March became the inspiration for many of the plays, paintings, and folk songs produced during the Yan'an Period.

As discussed in Theme I, a key feature of Party policy in Yan'an developed around the role of the arts in the Communist Revolution. Mao's own fondness for literature, philosophy, and poetry was crucial in developing the Party's relationship to the arts. In Yan'an, partly at his

¹²⁹ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [10].

¹³⁰ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [12].

¹³¹ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [15].

¹³² Schram, "Mao Tse-Tung," [383].

encouragement, the Party decided the “cultural front” was as important as the military one in converting the hearts and minds of the masses.¹³³

The 1942 Yan’an Forum on Art and Literature would be a watershed moment for the CCP’s relationship with the arts. It was at this forum that the Mao made clear his position that literature must be guided by a “party spirit” and designed for the masses.¹³⁴ Despite his own experience writing traditional poetry and writing essays, Mao called for reform in literature and for the necessity of literature’s popularization.¹³⁵ Average Chinese citizens, especially the poor masses, were not educated enough to read nor understand the stylistic writings of the intellectuals, therefore literature would have to be catered to this specific audience if it was to serve its purpose of proselytizing the masses.¹³⁶ This was in accordance with his long held belief that the future of Communism in China hinged upon the support of the peasantry. Mao’s fixation on the peasant masses above all other classes of society further contributes to the assertion that Mao was a demagogue in the traditional sense. While his motivation for espousing the cause of the common people in China may have simply been a political strategy, it does not change the fact that the people of greatest concern to Mao were the peasant masses.

From the Party’s base in Yan’an the work of the literary intellectuals disseminated throughout China, proving a crucial element to the Communist Party’s success at winning the minds and hearts of the Chinese people. After 1949,

¹³³ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [378].

¹³⁴ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [30].

¹³⁵ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [388].

¹³⁶ Judd, "Prelude to the 'Yan,'" [389].

Mao would continue to use his own writings, literature and agitprop to mold public opinion and gather support.¹³⁷ An example of this is his essay entitled *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship* wherein Mao made explicit that his rule was to be a single-party dictatorship.¹³⁸ The government was to be organized in the same style Mao employed in Yan'an, that of the political elite controlling the Proletarian Revolution.¹³⁹

Weber asserts that charismatic authority is inherently unstable and requires the leader to continually prove himself, or for the leader to perpetually create a state of instability that necessitates his leadership. This, interestingly, aligns somewhat with Mao's own belief that the development of communism required a continual class struggle.¹⁴⁰ After the establishment of the Communist State in 1949, Mao did continue to exercise his authority through mass movements such as the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the Great Leap Forward. The failures of the latter, sidelined Mao's involvement in the governing of China in the 1960's and opened him up to criticism from within the Party.¹⁴¹ In a sense, this could suggest that the failure of the Great Leap Forward equates to Mao's failure to validate his charismatic authority. His authority therefore eroded, enabling for Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to expand their influence within the Party.

Continuing that line of inquiry, it is possible to view the Cultural Revolution as an attempt by Mao to re-establish his charismatic authority over the Communist Party, as well as create an environment of instability that would in turn warrant a charismatic leader. While the Cultural Revolution was successful in disrupting the social order in government, schools, and factories it also produced rampant factionalism among revolutionary groups competing for

¹³⁷ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [37].

¹³⁸ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [36].

¹³⁹ Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung," [32].

¹⁴⁰ Schram, "Mao Tse-Tung," [384].

¹⁴¹ Yan and Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, [3-6].

power.¹⁴² Thus, while Mao did attempt to regain power through the creation of social instability, he was ultimately unable to control the revolutionary forces he released. This resulted in much of China being placed under military rule by 1967.¹⁴³ In implementing military rule Mao sacrificed some of his authority to the People's Liberation Army in return for control of the revolution.

In fact, many of Mao's aims for the Cultural Revolution were not fully realized, requiring Mao to shift course.¹⁴⁴ This implies that Mao's charismatic authority did not fully recover from the failures of the Great Leap Forward and as result affected his ability to rule effectively during the Cultural Revolution. My conclusion, therefore, is that while Mao enjoyed sufficient authority to regain Party leadership from Liu and Deng, it was still not enough to overpower the societal turbulence he created in order to reclaim it. Through the lens of Weber, the motivations behind the Cultural Revolution come into focus, and these in turn develop our understanding of why the chaos of the period persisted long after it had served its intended purpose.

Weber's concept of charismatic authority is by no means a complete and total explanation of Mao, a task that would prove impossible. It is precisely due to the overwhelmingly complicated nature of Mao that I chose to evaluate him through the lens of a theory like that of Weber's charismatic authority. This framework allowed me to test the limits of Weber's theory while also enabling me to cut through the noise and focus on the elements of Mao that prompted his complicated legacy.

¹⁴² Andrew G. Walder, "Factional Conflict at Beijing University, 1966-1968," *The China Quarterly*, no. 188 (December 2006): [1024], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192703>.

¹⁴³ Yan and Gao, *Turbulent Decade*, [67].

¹⁴⁴ Walder, "Mao Zedong," audio file.

Andrew Jackson

Elected in 1828 after a failed run for office in 1824, Andrew Jackson was a sharp shift from his predecessors. He was the first president that was not a member of the founding fathers, as well as the first president to not have come from a privileged background. Instead, he began his life as the son of newly immigrated farming family. His career began as a lawyer and soon after shifted to a life of public service in the United States House of Representatives and the Senate. Thereafter he served in the Tennessee militia first as a colonel and later the commander. His military career was prolific, with Jackson leading successful efforts in the Creek War, the War of 1812, and the First Seminole War. His victory in the battle of New Orleans established his reputation as a national hero.¹⁴⁵

His ascension to the presidency was not a seamless one, as Jackson was opposed by “two-thirds of the newspapers, four-fifths of the clergy, the great bulk of the bankers, and practically all of the manufacturers.”¹⁴⁶ Combined with his upbringing, this solidified Jackson’s status as an outsider to the ruling elite. Exacerbating this otherness was his conviction that contemporary government did not serve the interests of the “workingmen”¹⁴⁷ but only the aristocracy.

The campaign of 1828 was a distinctly personal and adversarial one. Its significance is perhaps not obvious unless compared to previous iterations. The campaign process that we know

¹⁴⁵ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [158].

¹⁴⁶ Albert Somit, "Andrew Jackson as Political Theorist," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (June 1949): [106], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42621007>.

¹⁴⁷ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [104].

today is vastly different from the earliest versions, as it has evolved over time to reflect our nation's changing relationship with democracy.¹⁴⁸

The elections of the 18th century were little more than “orderly procedures” that selected the “society’s obvious, virtuous, natural leaders.”¹⁴⁹ The tone and atmosphere of these early elections was one of calmness and inevitability. Candidates did not even truly run for office, they stood for it. Overall the process can be thought of as a genuinely passive affair. The result, is that candidates were somewhat insulated from the voters. They were assumed, by virtue of being up for election at all, to be both moral and qualified men.

In the 1820’s the style of elections shifted, reflecting the sharp changes underway in the country. Political parties were gaining in influence, and universal white-male suffrage contributed to a far more involved campaign. It is with these early iterations in mind that Jackson’s campaign is so shocking. Unlike the previous passive campaigns, the campaign of 1828 “was fought largely on the basis of personalities”.¹⁵⁰ This suited Jackson who had a passionate disposition, and was a famous war hero. His fame brought a “personality-based mass excitement”¹⁵¹ to politics that had not been seen before. The importance of Jackson's personality to the success of his campaign indicates that Jackson derived authority through his charisma. Moreover, restrictions on voting in many states were lessened, allowing individuals greater autonomy in choosing a candidate. Issues such as slavery now came under the purview of the

¹⁴⁸ Gil Troy, "The Campaign Triumphant," *The Wilson Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (Summer 2012): [22], <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41933918>.

¹⁴⁹ Troy, "The Campaign," [22].

¹⁵⁰ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [106].

¹⁵¹ Troy, "The Campaign," [22].

president, not the states.¹⁵² With these changes came the need for candidates to embrace the very active demands of the campaign.

Jackson, as a candidate, was very suited to this new style and successfully mobilized the masses in with a vibrant campaign.¹⁵³ A significant pillar of his campaign was his strong convictions about the ruling elite who he believed “put down the sovereignty of the people and usurped the government”.¹⁵⁴ Given his humble background he became the champion of the workingmen and common people, advocating for their rights and interests. Jackson emphasized his differences from establishment politicians making it clear that his sympathies and loyalty remained with the common man.¹⁵⁵ Similar to Mao, Jackson’s political base was populated by common men, suggesting that Jackson too was a demagogue.

His opponent John Quincy Adams was supremely intellectual, a hangover from the old order. Their contest was colloquially described as one between a man who could write, and a man who could fight. Like Jefferson, Quincy Adams’ detractors criticized him for his comfortable upbringing and lack of practical experience. Although he was a well educated man, his formal education was contrasted, to his detriment, against Jackson’s experiential education.¹⁵⁶ Jackson’s win signaled a broader shift underway in the United States, away from our European past. This period saw public fascination with the wild frontier grow within the United States, and Jackson embodied the natural wisdom of a frontiersman.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Troy, "The Campaign," [22].

¹⁵³ Troy, "The Campaign," [23].

¹⁵⁴ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [106].

¹⁵⁵ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [107].

¹⁵⁶ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [158].

¹⁵⁷ Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American*, [158-159].

In the early 19th century the demographics of citizens were shifting; previously the Republican base has been agrarian in nature, and Jackson played to this early in his tenure. During this time, however, the economic structure of American society was experiencing profound shifts. The country was becoming increasingly urbanized, and thus the Republican party needed to expand its base from its traditional agrarian focus, to include the new proletariat.¹⁵⁸ In order to capture this new group, Jackson's economic policies reflected his belief in "the differing interests of economic classes".¹⁵⁹

As president, Jackson continued to demonstrate his strength, such as through his campaign against The Second Bank of the United States. From his post, he issued a scathing veto of the bank charter. This was a calculated political move for Jackson, intended to appeal to popular sentiment and prejudices against federal institutions.¹⁶⁰ Jackson criticism of the Bank appealed to common people who believed that its profits only benefitted foreign stakeholders and the very wealthy. Moreover, it suggests that Jackson, who was only concerned with the practical issues of political theory,¹⁶¹ recognized the necessity of regularly proving his authority. This, naturally, is a crucial criterion for Weber's charismatic authority, although Weber's theory does not adequately explain the entire trajectory of Jackson's presidency. While Weber's theory of charismatic authority can adequately account for the rise of Andrew Jackson as a charismatic demagogue, it is not as relevant once he leaves office. Part of this could be Weber's theory is better applied to leaders who both assume and lose power in non-democratic systems, because

¹⁵⁸ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [107].

¹⁵⁹ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [105].

¹⁶⁰ Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [119].

¹⁶¹ "Jackson was interested only in the practical and immediate problems of political theory; abstract questions were completely beyond his concern." Somit, "Andrew Jackson," [125].

even though he enjoyed enormous popularity throughout his presidency his term was still limited to 8 years. Perhaps instead, the victory of his chosen successor against his old enemy Clay, is the best indicator we can have in a democratic system that Jackson's charismatic authority lasted.

Section III

Conclusion

Political events in 2016, and 2017 indicated to the world at large that right-wing populism was on the rise. A feature of this ultra-conservatism was a distrust of experts, scientific authority, and traditional institutions. In contrast to contemporary headlines, this was not the first time in history that the West had grappled with such extreme forces and societal divisions. Even though I was looking to make sense of the growing volatility in politics and society at large, I could address that subject in any meaningful way unless I focused my inquiry. I chose to pursue anti-intellectualism, because I hold that it is a symptom of the larger issue at hand: the increasing factionalism and polarization of American society.

Anti-intellectualism is itself a large and complex topic, getting to the heart of which was fantastically difficult. This is partly due to the importance of context to each anti-intellectual movement. Aiming to identify the central features of every anti-intellectual movement, I chose to discuss two seemingly opposite countries in tandem, Communist China and the United States. In doing so I was able to show that the commonalities between anti-intellectualism in these two countries were a product of anti-intellectualism, and therefore not coincidental.

Moreover, exploring Communist China and the United States allowed me to form an alternate perspective on the topic of anti-intellectualism as a whole.

As stated previously, the nature of my inquiry was necessarily interdisciplinary and multi-pronged. In Theme I the trajectory and course of anti-intellectualism in each country was

discussed and related to its each country's history of anti-intellectualism. While this section highlighted a key difference between Communist China and the United States, it also underscored critical points of similarity.

Theme II took a more theoretical approach to anti-intellectualism, analyzing it as sociopolitical movement characterized by the antagonism between society and the intellectual. Through our Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber we were able to link anti-intellectualism to classic theories in sociology, implying that anti-intellectualism fits within the broader narrative of sociopolitical movements.

The final piece of this study, considered the role of a charismatic leader in anti-intellectualism, focusing on Mao and Andrew Jackson. Both leaders came to power through the widespread support of the common people in a period marked by societal turbulence or dramatic social shifts. Moreover their individual strengths of character were a central source of their authority, requiring them to continuously prove themselves in order to maintain power and control.

The relevance of this study to the political climate of 2017 is undeniable. What has perhaps been the most illuminating part of this study, are the overwhelming similarities between anti-intellectual movements of the past and present. We are often told that an ignorance of history dooms us to repeat its mistakes, yet there is a growing body of scholarship and popular writing on the topic of anti-intellectualism that suggests that cliché is not at work here.

Why then, is anti-intellectualism on the rise in 2017? The answer to this is likely a combination of factors covered in this paper. Consider, for example, the abrupt end to McCarthyism which came about do a concerted effort among intellectuals to criticize and discredit the movement. Compare that to the politicization of science in America, wherein

growing ideological divides among people results in the diminishing of scientists' cultural authority. The key difference is that America today is more fractured politically than ever before, because of this society is vulnerable to extremism in any form, including anti-intellectualism. This is because a divided society is ultimately a distracted one. Factions within American society are at war with one another, which has rendered them unaware and paralyzed in the face of growing anti-intellectualism. Finally, as noted in Theme III, these factors are not sufficient on their own; they require the leadership of an opportunistic, charismatic demagogue. We see examples of this not just in a Trump presidency, but in the leaders of Europe's far right: France's Marine Le Pen, Britain's Nigel Farage, The Netherlands' Geert Wilders, Greece's Nikos Michaloliakos, the list goes on suggesting that Europe is as equally divided as the United States. Beating back the tides of anti-intellectualism will be the challenge of the next few years; reversing anti-intellectualism is far more difficult than preventing it in the first place. It is imperative that we work to identify the initial hallmarks of anti-intellectualism in countries vulnerable to political extremism. The human and developmental cost of unchecked anti-intellectualism in China signals the immensity of what is at risk.

Biography

Through her experiences living in Beijing from 2008 to 2012, and 2015 to 2016, Abby Myers developed a deep love and keen interest China. The inspiration for this thesis came from an unexpected origin; Abby noticed that there were surprising similarities between her Chinese History classes in school, and the emerging Tea Party movement in the United States. After entering UT Austin and furthering her studies she became convinced that there existed compelling commonalities between the two disparate periods in history. Finding an ally in her conviction, Dr. Michael Mosser, Abby sought to prove that the central pillars of anti-intellectualism could link Cultural Revolution China and modern day United States.

After graduation Abby will work at Clearhead, a digital optimization agency, in South Austin.

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